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Abstract—Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are one of the
most challenging threats to Internet security. An attacker
typically compromises a large number of vulnerable hosts
and uses them to flood the victim’s site with malicious traf-
fic, clogging its tail circuit and interfering with normal traf-
fic. At present, the network operator of a site under attack
has no other resolution but to respond manually by inserting
filters in the appropriate edge routers to drop attack traf-
fic. However, as DoS attacks become increasingly sophisti-
cated, manual filter propagation becomes unacceptably slow
or even infeasible.
In this paper, we present Active Internet Traffic Filtering, a
new automatic filter propagation protocol. We argue that
this system provides a guaranteed, significant level of pro-
tection against DoS attacks in exchange for a reasonable,
bounded amount of router resources. We also argue that the
proposed system cannot be abused by a malicious node to
interfere with normal Internet operation. Finally, we argue
that it retains its efficiency in the face of continued Internet
growth.
I. Introduction
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are recognized as one of
the most challenging threats to Internet security. Any or-
ganization or enterprise that is dependent on the Internet
can be subject to a DoS attack, causing its service to be
severely disrupted, if not fail completely. The attacker typi-
cally uses a worm to create an “army” of zombies, which she
orchestrates to flood the victim’s site with malicious traf-
fic. This malicious traffic exhausts the victim’s resources,
thereby seriously affecting the victim’s ability to respond
to normal traffic.
A network layer solution is required because the end-user
or end-organization has no way to protect its tail circuit
from being congested by an attack, causing the disruption
sought by the attacker. For example, if an enterprise has a
10 Mbps connection to the Internet, an attacker can com-
mand its zombies to send traffic far exceeding this 10 Mbps
rate to this enterprise, completely congesting the down-
stream link to the enterprise and causing normal traffic to
be dropped.
Network operators use conventional router filtering capa-
bilities to respond to DoS attacks. Typically, an operator
of a site under attack identifies the nature of the packets
being used in the attack by some packet collection facil-
ity, installs a filter in its firewall/edge router to block these
packets and then requests its ISP to install comparable fil-
ters in its routers to remove this traffic from the tail circuit
to the site. Each ISP can further communicate with its
peering ISPs to block this unwanted traffic as well, if it so
desires.
Currently, this propagation of filters is manual: the oper-
ator on each site determines the necessary filters and adds
them to each router configuration. In several attacks, the
operators of different networks have been forced to com-
municate by telephone given that the network connection,
and thus email, was inoperable because of the attack.
As DoS attacks become increasingly sophisticated, man-
ual filter propagation becomes unacceptably slow or even
infeasible. For example, an attack can switch from one
protocol to another, move between source networks as well
as oscillate between on and off far faster than any human
can respond. In general, network operators are confronting
an “arms race” in which any defense, such as manually in-
stalled filters, is viewed as a challenge by the community
of attacker-types to defeat. Exploiting a weakness such as
human speeds of filter configuration is an obvious direction
for an attacker to pursue.
The concept of automatic filter propagation has already
been introduced in [MBF+01]: a router is configured with
a filter to drop (or rate-limit) certain traffic; if it contin-
ues to drop a significant amount of this traffic, it requests
that the upstream router take over and block the traffic.
However, the crucial issues associated with automatic filter
propagation are still unaddressed.
The real problem is how to efficiently manage the
bounded number of filters available to a network operator
to provide this filtering support. An attacker can change
protocols, source addresses, port numbers, etc. requiring a
very large number of filters. However, a sophisticated hard-
ware router has a fixed maximum number of wire-speed
filters that can block traffic with no degradation in router
performance. The maximum is determined by hardware
table sizes and is typically limited to several thousand. A
software router is typically less constrained by table space,
but incurs a processing overhead for each additional filter.
This usually limits the practical number of filters to even
less than a hardware router. Moreover, there is a processing
cost at each router for installing each new filter, removing
the old filters and sending and receiving filter propagation
protocol messages.
Given the restricted amount of filtering resources avail-
able to each router, hop-by-hop filter propagation towards
the attacker’s site clearly does not scale: Internet backbone
2routers would quickly become the “filtering bottleneck”
having to satisfy filtering requests coming from all the cor-
ners of the Internet. Fortunately, traceback [SWKA00]
[SPS+01] makes it possible to identify a router close to the
attacker and send it a filtering request directly. However,
any filter propagation mechanism other than hop-by-hop
raises a serious security issue: Once a router starts accept-
ing filtering requests from unknown sources, how can it
trust that these requests are not forged by malicious nodes
seeking to disrupt normal communication between other
nodes?
In this paper we propose a new filter propagation pro-
tocol called AITF (Active Internet Traffic Filtering): The
victim sends a filtering request to its network gateway. The
victim’s gateway temporarily blocks the undesired traffic,
while it propagates the request to the attacker’s gateway.
As we will see, the protocol both motivates and assists the
attacker’s gateway to block the attack. Moreover, a router
receiving a filtering request satisfies it only if it determines
that the requestor is on the same path with the specified
undesired traffic. Thus, the filter cannot affect any nodes
in the Internet other than those already operating at the
mercy of the requestor.
The novel aspect of AITF is that it enables each partici-
pating service provider to guarantee to its clients a specific,
significant amount of protection against DoS attacks, while
it requires only a bounded credible amount of resources. At
the same time it is secure i.e., it cannot be abused by a ma-
licious node to harm (e.g. block legitimate traffic to) other
nodes. Finally, it scales with Internet size i.e., it keeps its
efficiency in the face of continued Internet growth.
II. Active Internet Traffic Filtering (AITF)
A. Terminology
A flow label is a set of values that captures the common
characteristics of a traffic flow – e.g., “all packets with IP
source address S and IP destination address D”.
A filtering request is a request to block a flow of packets
– all packets matching a specific wildcarded flow label – for
the next T time units.
A filtering contract between networks A and B specifies:
i. The filtering request rate R1 at which A accepts fil-
tering requests to block certain traffic to B.
ii. The filtering request rate R2 at which A can send fil-
tering requests to get B to block certain traffic from coming
into A.
An AITF network is an Autonomous Domain which has
a filtering contract with each of its end-hosts and each
neighbor Autonomous Domain directly connected to it. An
AITF node is either an end-host or a border router 1 in an
AITF network.
Finally, we define the following terms with respect to an
undesired flow: The attack path is the set of AITF nodes
the undesired flow goes through. The attacker is the origin
1A border router is a router that has interfaces in more than one
AITF networks.
of the undesired flow. The victim is the target of the unde-
sired flow. The attacker’s gateway is the AITF node closest
to the attacker along the attack path. Similarly, the vic-
tim’s gateway is the AITF node closest to the victim along
the attack path.
B. Overview
The AITF protocol enables a service provider to protect
a client against N undesired flows, by using only n ≪ N
filters and a DRAM cache of size O(N). The motivation is
that each router can afford gigabytes of DRAM but only a
limited number of filters.
In an AITF world, each Autonomous Domain (AD) is an
AITF network i.e., it has filtering contracts with all its end-
hosts and peering ADs. These contracts limit the rates by
which the AD can send/receive filtering requests to/from
its end-hosts and peering ADs. The limited rates allow
the receiving router to police the requests to the specified
rates and indiscriminately drop requests when the rate is
in excess of the agreed rate. Thus, the router can limit the
CPU cycles used to process filtering requests as well as the
number of filters it requires.
An AITF filtering request is initially sent from the victim
to the victim’s gateway; the victim’s gateway propagates
it to the attacker’s gateway; finally, the attacker’s gateway
propagates it to the attacker. Both the victim’s gateway
and the attacker’s gateway install filters to block the un-
desired flow. The victim’s gateway installs a filter only
temporarily, to immediately protect the victim, while it
waits for the attacker’s gateway to take responsibility. The
attacker’s gateway is expected to install a filter and block
the undesired flow for T time units.
If the undesired flow stops within some grace period, the
victim’s gateway interprets this as a hint that the attacker’s
gateway has taken over and removes its temporary filter.
This leaves the door open to “on-off” undesired flows 2. In
order to detect and block such “on-off” flows, the victim’s
gateway needs to remember each filtering request for at
least T time units. Thus, the victim’s gateway, installs a
filter for Ttmp ≪ T time units, but keeps a “shadow” of
the filter in DRAM for T time units 3.
The attacker’s gateway expects the attacker to stop the
undesired flow within a grace period. Otherwise, it holds
the right to disconnect from her. This fact encourages the
attacker to stop the undesired flow. Similarly, the victim’s
gateway expects the attacker’s gateway to block the unde-
sired flow within a grace period. Otherwise, the mechanism
escalates : The victim’s gateway now plays the role of the
victim (i.e., it sends a filtering request to its own gateway)
and the attacker’s gateway plays the role of the attacker
(i.e., it is asked to stop the undesired flow or risk discon-
nection). The escalation process should become clear with
the example in II-D.
2When the attacker’s gateway does not cooperate, the attacker can
start an undesired flow, stop long enough to trick the victim’s gateway
into removing its temporary filter, then start again and so on.
3Keeping each filter for T time units is very expensive – doing so
would defeat the whole purpose of pushing filtering to the attacker’s
gateway.
3Thus, the mechanism proceeds in rounds. At each round,
only four nodes are involved. In the first round, the mech-
anism tries to push filtering of undesired traffic back to the
AITF node closest to the attacker. If that fails, it tries the
second closest AITF node to the attacker and so on.
C. Basic protocol
The AITF protocol involves only one type of message:
a filtering request. A filtering request contains a flow label
and a type field. The latter specifies whether this request is
addressed to the victim’s gateway, the attacker’s gateway
or the attacker.
The only nodes in an AITF network that speak the AITF
protocol are end-hosts and border routers. Internal routers
do not participate.
AITF node X sends a filtering request to AITF node Y ,
when X wants a certain traffic flow coming through Y to
be blocked for T time units.
When AITF node Y receives a filtering request, it checks
which end-host or peering network the request is received
from/through. If that end-host or peering network has ex-
ceeded its allowed rate, the request is dropped. If not, Y
looks at the specified undesired flow label and takes certain
actions:
− If Y is the victim’s gateway:
i. It installs a temporary filter to block the undesired
flow for Ttmp ≪ T time units.
ii. It logs the filtering request in DRAM for T time
units.
iii. It propagates the filtering request to the attacker’s
gateway. If the attacker’s gateway does not block the flow
within Ttmp time units, Y propagates the filtering request
to its own gateway.
− If Y is the attacker’s gateway:
i. It installs a filter to block the undesired flow for T
time units.
ii. It propagates the filtering request to the attacker.
If the attacker does not stop the flow within a grace period,
Y disconnects from her.
− If Y itself is the attacker, it stops the flow (to avoid
disconnection).
We should note that the behavior described above is that
of a non-compromised, non-malicious node. Neither the
attacker not even the attacker’s gateway are expected to
always conform to this behavior. AITF operation does not
rely on their cooperation.
D. Example
In Figure 1 G host – which stands for “good host” – is
an end-host residing in enterprise network G net, which is
connected to local ISP G isp through router G gw1. G isp
runs a regional network that connects through its backbone
router G gw2 to a wide-area ISP G wan. Similarly, B host
– which stands for “bad host” – is an end-host residing in
enterprise network B net etc.
B host starts sending an undesired flow to G host.
G host sends a filtering request to G gw1 against B host.
Upon reception of G host’s request, G gw1 temporarily
G_net
B_net
G_isp G_wan
B_isp B_wan
G_host G_gw1 G_gw2 G_gw3
B_host B_gw1 B_gw2 B_gw3
Fig. 1
Example attack path from attacker B host to victim G host
blocks the undesired flow but also propagates the request
to B gw1.
On the other side, upon reception of G gw1’s request,
B gw1 immediately blocks the undesired flow, but also
propagates the filtering request to B host. B host either
stops the undesired flow or risks being disconnected. Thus,
if B gw1 cooperates, by the end of the first round, filtering
of the undesired flow has been successfully pushed to the
AITF node closest to the attacker (B gw1).
Of course, B gw1 may decide not to cooperate and ig-
nore the filtering request. Then, the mechanism escalates:
G gw1 propagates the filtering request to G gw2. G gw2
temporarily blocks all undesired traffic, but also propagates
the filtering request to B gw2 and so on. Thus, if B gw2
cooperates, by the end of the second round, filtering of the
undesired flow has been successfully pushed to the second
closest to the attacker AITF node (B gw2).
In the worst-case scenario, even B gw3 refuses to coop-
erate. As a result, G gw3 disconnects from B gw3.
E. Verifying a filtering request
In a network architecture where source address spoofing
is allowed, compromised node M can maliciously request
the blocking of traffic from A to V thereby disrupting their
communication. To avoid this, we add a simple extension
to the basic protocol.
The extension introduces two more messages: A verifi-
cation query and a verification reply. Both types include a
flow label and a nonce (i.e., a random number).
When router Y receives a filtering request, which asks for
the blocking of a traffic flow from attacker A to victim V ,
Y verifies that the request is real before taking any action
to satisfy it. If Y is the victim’s gateway, this verification
is trivial with appropriate ingress filtering. If Y is the at-
tacker’s gateway, verification is accomplished through the
following “3-way handshake”:
i. Router Y receives a filtering request, asking for the
blocking of a traffic flow from attacker A to victim V .
ii. Y sends a verification query to V , asking “Do you
really not want this traffic flow?”
iii. V responds to Y with a verification reply. The reply
must include the same flow label and nonce included in the
query.
If the nonce on V ’s reply is the same with the nonce on
Y ’s query, Y accepts the request as real and proceeds to
4satisfy it. The “3-way handshake” is further discussed in
III-B.
F. Assumptions
AITF operation assumes that the victim’s gateway can
determine
− Who is the attacker’s gateway (in order to propagate
the request).
− Who is the next AITF node on the attack path (in order
to escalate, if necessary).
These assumptions are met, if an efficient traceback tech-
nique as those described in [SWKA00] [SPS+01] is avail-
able.
Also AITF assumes that off-path traffic monitoring is
not possible i.e., if node M is not located on the path from
node A to node V , then M cannot monitor traffic sent
on that path (this assumption is necessary for the “3-way
handshake”).
III. Discussion
A. Why it works
The basic idea of AITF is to push filtering of undesired
traffic to the network closest to the attacker. That is, hold
a service provider responsible for providing connectivity to
a misbehaving client and have it do the dirty job. The
question is, why would the attacker’s service provider ac-
cept (or at least be encouraged) to do that?
If the attacker’s service provider does not cooperate, it
risks being disconnected by its own service provider. This
makes sense for both of them: If B net in Figure 1 refuses
to block its misbehaving client, the filtering burden falls on
B isp. Thus, it makes sense for B isp to consider B net
a bad client and disconnect from it. On the other hand,
this offers an incentive to B net to cooperate and block
the undesired flow. Otherwise, it will be disconnected by
B isp, which will result in all of its clients being dissatisfied.
Moreover, AITF offers an economic incentive to
providers to protect their network from the inside by em-
ploying appropriate ingress filtering. If a provider pro-
actively prevents spoofed flows from exiting its network,
it lowers the probability of an attack being launched from
its own network, thus reducing the number of expected
filtering requests it will later have to satisfy to avoid dis-
connection.
In short, AITF creates a cost vs quality trade-off for ser-
vice providers: Either they pay the cost to block the unde-
sired flows generated by their few bad clients, or they run
the risk of dissatisfying their legitimate clients, which are
the vast majority. Thus, the quality of a provider’s service
is now related to its capability to filter its own misbehaving
clients.
B. Why it is secure
The greatest challenge with automatic filtering mecha-
nisms is that compromised node M may maliciously re-
quest the blocking of traffic from A to V , thereby disrupt-
ing their communication. AITF prevents this through the
“3-way handshake” described in II-E.
The “3-way handshake” does not exactly verify the au-
thenticity of a filtering request. It only enables A’s gate-
way to verify that a request to block traffic from A to V
has been sent by a node located on the path from A to
V . A compromised router located on this path can natu-
rally forge and snoop handshake messages to disrupt A-V
communication. However, such a compromised router can
disrupt A-V communication anyway, by simply dropping
the corresponding packets. 4
In short, AITF cannot be abused by a compromised node
to cause interruption of a legitimate traffic flow, unless that
compromised node is responsible for routing the flow, in
which case it can interrupt the flow anyway.
C. Why it scales
AITF scales with Internet size, because it pushes filter-
ing of undesired traffic to the leaves of the Internet, where
filtering capacity follows Internet growth.
In most cases, AITF pushes filtering of undesired traffic
to the provider(s) of the attacker(s). Thus, the amount of
filtering requests a provider is asked to satisfy grows pro-
portionally to the number of the provider’s (misbehaving)
clients. However, intuitively, a provider’s filtering capacity
also grows proportionally to the number of its clients. 5 In
short, a provider’s filtering capacity follows the provider’s
filtering workload.
If the attacker’s provider is itself compromised, AITF
naturally fails to push filtering to it. Instead, filtering is
performed by another network, closer to the Internet core.
If this situation occurred often, then the scalability argu-
ment stated above would be false. Fortunately, compro-
mised routers are a very small percentage of the Internet
infrastructure. 6 Thus, AITF fails to push filtering to the
attacker’s provider with a very small probability.
IV. Performance Analysis
In this section we provide simple formulas that describe
AITF performance. For lack of space and given that our
formulas are very simple and intuitive, we defer any details
to [AC03].
A. The victim’s perspective
A.1 Effective bandwidth of an undesired flow
AITF significantly reduces the effective bandwidth of an
undesired flow – i.e., the bandwidth of the undesired flow
actually experienced by the victim. Specifically, it can be
shown that AITF reduces the effective bandwidth of an
undesired flow by a factor of
r ≈
n(Td + Tr)
T
4We assumed that off-path traffic monitoring is impossible. Thus,
an off-path malicious node cannot snoop handshake messages.
5In the AITF model, the filtering contract becomes part of a
provider’s services. Thus, a part of each client’s service fee is invested
in provisioning the provider’s routers with extra filters.
6It is difficult to compromise a router, because of the limited num-
ber of potentially exploitable services it offers. Moreover, service
providers have an immense economic incentive to keep their routers
uncompromised.
5where n is the number of non-cooperating 7 AITF nodes
on the attack path, Td is attack detection time and Tr is
the one-way delay from the victim to its gateway. T is
the timeout associated with all filtering requests i.e. each
filtering request asks for the blocking of a flow for T time
units. For example, if the only non-cooperating node on
the attack path is the attacker, and if the one-way delay
from the victim to its gateway is Tr = 50 msec, for T = 1
min, an AITF node can reduce the effective bandwidth of
an undesired flow by a factor r ≈ 0.00083. 8
Here we only demonstrate this result for n = 1 i.e., when
the only non-cooperating node on the attack path is the at-
tacker: At time 0 the attacker starts the undesired flow; at
time Td the victim detects it and sends a filtering request;
at time Td+Tr the victim’s gateway temporarily blocks the
flow and the victim stops receiving it; the flow is eventually
blocked by the attacker’s gateway and released after time
T . Thus, if the original bandwidth of the undesired flow is
B, its effective bandwidth is Be ≈ B ·
Td+Tr
T
.
When n ≥ 1 i.e., when 1 or more AITF routers close
to the attacker are non-cooperating, the attacker can play
“on-off” games: Pretend to stop the undesired flow to trick
the victim’s gateway into removing its filter, then resume
the flow etc. The victim’s gateway detects and blocks such
attackers by using its DRAM cache.
A.2 Number of undesired flows
An AITF node is guaranteed protection against a specific
number of undesired flows, which depends on its contract
with its service provider. Specifically, it can be shown that
if a client is allowed to send R1 filtering requests per time
unit to the provider, then the client is protected 9 against
Nv = R1 · T
simultaneous undesired flows. For example, for R1 = 100
filtering requests per second and T = 1 min, the client
is protected against Nv = 6, 000 simultaneous undesired
flows.
B. Filtering close to the victim
AITF enables a service provider to protect a client
against Nv undesired flows by using only nv ≪ Nv fil-
ters. Specifically, it can be shown that if a client is allowed
to send R1 filtering requests per time unit to the provider,
the provider needs nv filters and a DRAM cache that can
fit mv filtering requests in order to satisfy all the requests,
where
nv = R1 · Ttmp, mv = R1 · T
7By non-cooperating node we mean an AITF node, which does not
take its responsibility to filter an undesired flow for T time units.
8Td may be significant the first time the undesired flow is detected.
Here, we ignore that initial overhead. Detecting a reappearing unde-
sired flow could be as fast as matching a received packet header to a
logged undesired flow label i.e., insignificant compared to the one-way
delay to the victim’s gateway.
9When we say that the client is “protected” against an undesired
flow, we mean that the client can significantly reduce the effective
bandwidth of the flow, as described in the previous subsection.
Ttmp is the amount of time that elapses from the moment
the victim’s gateway installs a temporary filter until it re-
moves it. The purpose of the temporary filter is to block
the undesired flow until the attacker’s gateway takes over.
Therefore, Ttmp should be large enough to allow the trace-
back from the victim’s gateway to the attacker’s gateway
plus the 3-way handshake. For example, suppose we use an
architecture like [CG00], where traceback is automatically
provided inside each packet. Then traceback time is 0. If
the 3-way handshake between the two gateways takes 600
msec, for R1 = 100 filtering requests per second and T = 1
min, the service provider needs nv = 60 filters to protect a
client against Nv = 6, 000 undesired flows.
C. Filtering close to the attacker
AITF requires a bounded amount of resources from
the attacker’s service provider. Specifically, if a service
provider is allowed to send R2 filtering requests per time
unit to a client, then the provider needs
na = R2 · T
filters in order to ensure that the client satisfies all the
requests. Given these resources, the provider can filter
Na = na = R2 · T simultaneous undesired flows generated
by the client. For example, for R2 = 1 filtering request
per second and T = 1 min, the provider needs na = 60
filters for the client. This filtering request rate allows the
provider to filter up to Na = 60 simultaneous undesired
flows generated by the client.
D. The attacker’s perspective
We have defined an attacker as the source of an unde-
sired flow. By this definition, an attacker is not necessarily
a malicious/compromised node; it is simply a node being
asked to stop sending a certain flow. A legitimate AITF
node must be provisioned to stop sending undesired flows
when requested, in order to avoid disconnection.
AITF requires a bounded amount of resources from the
attacker as well. Specifically, if a service provider is allowed
to send R2 filtering requests per time unit to a client, the
client needs
na = R2 · T
filters (as many as the provider) in order to satisfy all the
requests. For example, for R2 = 1 filtering request per
second and T = 1 min, the client needs na = 60 filters.
V. Related Work
In [MBF+01] Mahajan et al. propose mechanisms for de-
tecting and controlling high bandwidth traffic aggregates.
One part of their work discusses how a node determines
whether it is congested and how it identifies the aggre-
gate(s) responsible for the congestion. In contrast, we start
from the point where the node has identified the undesired
flow(s). In that sense, their work and our work are comple-
mentary. Another part of their work discusses how much
to rate-limit an annoying aggregate due to a DoS attack or
6a flash crowd. In contrast, our mechanism focuses on DoS
attack traffic and attempts to limit it to rate 0. 10
The part of their work most related to ours proposes
a cooperative pushback mechanism: A congested node at-
tempts to rate-limit an aggregate by dropping a portion of
its packets. If the drop rate remains high for several sec-
onds, the node considers that it has failed to rate-limit the
aggregate and asks its adjacent upstream routers to do it.
If the recipient routers also fail to rate-limit the aggregate,
they recursively propagate pushback further upstream.
A pushback request is propagated hop by hop by the vic-
tim towards the attacker. In contrast, the propagation of
an AITF filtering request involves only 4 nodes: the vic-
tim, the victim’s gateway, the attacker’s gateway and the
attacker – we claim that this allows AITF to scale with In-
ternet size. A pushback request does not force the recipient
router to rate-limit the problematic aggregate; it relies on
its good will to cooperate. In contrast, AITF forces the at-
tacker to discontinue the undesired flow and the attacker’s
service provider to filter the attacker or else risk disconnec-
tion – we claim that this makes AITF deployable.
In [PL01] Park and Lee propose DPF (Distributed
Packet Filtering), a distributed ingress-filtering mechanism
for pro-actively blocking spoofed flows. In contrast, AITF
aims at blocking all undesired – including spoofed – flows
as close as possible to their sources. Thus, it cannot be
replaced by DPF. On the other hand, DPF blocks most
spoofed flows before they reach their destination i.e., DPF
is proactive, whereas AITF is reactive. In that sense, DPF
and AITF are complementary.
In [KMR02] Keromytis et al. propose SOS (Secure Over-
lay Services), an architecture for pro-actively protecting
against DoS attacks the communication between a pre-
determined location and a specific set of users who have
authorized access to communicate with that location. In
contrast, AITF addresses the more general problem of pro-
tecting against DoS attacks any location accessible to all
Internet users.
Finally, [SWKA00] and [SPS+01] propose traceback so-
lutions i.e., mechanisms that enable a victim to reconstruct
the path followed by attack packets in the face of source
address spoofing. As already mentioned, an efficient trace-
back mechanism is necessary to AITF operation.
VI. Conclusions
We presented AITF, an automatic filter propagation
mechanism, according to which each Autonomous Domain
(AD) has a filtering contract with each of its end-hosts and
neighbor ADs. A filtering contract with a neighbor pro-
vides a guaranteed, significant level of protection against
DoS attacks coming through that neighbor in exchange for
10We believe that DoS attacks should be addressed separately from
flash crowds: Flash crowd aggregates are created by legitimate traf-
fic. Therefore, it makes sense to rate-limit them instead of completely
blocking them. On the contrary, DoS attack traffic aims at disrupt-
ing the victim’s operation. Therefore, it makes sense to block it.
Blocking a traffic flow is simpler and cheaper than rate-limiting it.
Moreover, DoS attack traffic is generated by malicious/compromised
nodes. Therefore, it demands a more intelligent defense mechanism.
a reasonable, bounded amount of router resources.
Specifically:
− Given a filtering contract between a client and a service
provider, which allows the client to send R1 filtering re-
quests per time unit to the provider, the provider can pro-
tect the client against a large number of undesired flows
Nv = R1 · T , by significantly limiting the effective band-
width of each undesired flow. The provider achieves this by
using only a modest number of filters nv = R1 ·Ttmp ≪ Nv.
− Given a filtering contract between a client and a service
provider, which allows the provider to send R2 filtering
requests per time unit to the client, both the client and the
provider need a bounded number of filters na = R2 · T to
honor their contract.
We argued that AITF successfully deals with the biggest
challenge to automatic filtering mechanisms: source ad-
dress spoofing. Namely, we argued that it is not possible
for any malicious/compromised node to abuse AITF in or-
der to interrupt a legitimate traffic flow, unless the com-
promised node is responsible for routing that flow, in which
case it can interrupt the flow anyway.
Finally, we argued that AITF scales with Internet size,
because it pushes filtering of undesired traffic to the ser-
vice providers of the attackers, unless the service providers
are themselves compromised. Fortunately, compromised
routers are a very small percentage of Internet infrastruc-
ture. Thus, in the vast majority of cases, AITF pushes
filtering of undesired traffic to the leaves of the Internet,
where filtering capacity follows Internet growth.
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